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MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS: THE FUTURE OF THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE  
Joseph Henn1
I. INTRODUCTION
The latest development in the saga of the ever encompassing Confrontation 
Clause comes from the Supreme Court, via a five-four vote, in the case of         
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (Melendez-Diaz), which takes the Sixth   
Amendment to lengths hard to fathom.2  Simply stated, the Confrontation Clause 
now demands that a laboratory technician, who merely performs a routine analysis 
to determine if a substance is an illegal drug, is considered a testimonial witness 
against the accused.  Under the guise of the Confrontation Clause, the accused has 
the constitutional right to haul the technician into court. The purpose of this article 
is to show the error in the majorities’ decision in Melendez-Diaz by approaching 
the issue from two perspectives.  First, by investigating the cases and legal        
doctrines created by the Supreme Court in the years preceding Melendez-Diaz, I 
will demonstrate why the case was erroneously decided.3  Second, I will explore 
the possibility that the majority decision was correct and thus the recently devised 
standard in Crawford v. Washington (Crawford) is inherently flawed.4  This article 
will discuss the prior application of law before the Melendez-Diaz decision, offer 
analysis on the string of cases that led to the Melendez-Diaz decision, and evaluate 
where the law went wrong.  Finally, this article will introduce a revised legal    
doctrine on what should be considered testimonial evidence against an accused 
based upon sound policy considerations and the Sixth Amendment rights of the 
accused.  
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS LAW PRIOR TO THE DECISION IN MELENDEZ-DIAZ
Prior to the decision handed down in Melendez-Diaz,5 the country had nearly 
five years to conform to the sweeping change that the Crawford opinion made to 
the Confrontation Clause.6  Only one year after the Crawford decision, Massachu-
setts was confronted with the case of Commonwealth v. Verde (Verde), which was 
essentially indistinguishable from the issue in Melendez-Diaz.  When Verde
 ________________________  
 1. J.D. candidate, 2011, Barry University Dwayne O. Andres School of Law; B.A. (English Literature), 
B.A. (History), University of Central Florida, 2008. 
 2. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 3. See Id.  
 4. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 5. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527.
 6. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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reached the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the panel of Judges stated: “This appeal 
raises the question whether, in light of [Crawford], the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that laboratory     
technicians who analyze drugs seized as part of a criminal investigation             
authenticate their laboratory findings by appearing at a defendant’s trial.”7  The 
Court, adhering to the standard established by Crawford that testimonial evidence 
required confrontation of the witness, determined that a drug certificate or         
certificate of analysis was akin to a business record, and this type of evidence    
does not trigger the Confrontation Clause.8  The Massachusetts Supreme Court         
formulated this decision not only in adherence to Crawford, but also in              
accordance with established case precedent: “Certificates of chemical analysis are 
neither   discretionary nor based on opinion; rather, they merely state the results of 
a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of the 
substance.”9  The prior law, established by almost ninety years of Massachusetts’
jurisprudence, was clear; it was properly distinguished from the holding in     
Crawford, and most importantly it was narrowly tailored as not to offend the Sixth 
Amendment or its Confrontation Clause.   
The Verde Court dealt with the same arguments propounded in the case of   
Melendez-Diaz:  (1) the admission of the drug analysis certificates denied the    
defendant his constitutional right to confrontation because the technician who   
analyzed the substances and prepared the certificates did not testify; and (2)      
“testimonial” hearsay statements are barred under the Confrontation Clause unless 
the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.10  The court, however, disagreed with the defendant’s
application of Crawford and understood the term “testimonial evidence,” as it was 
described in Crawford, “applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”11
The Massachusetts court, after evaluating the historical analysis constructed by 
Justice Scalia in the Crawford opinion, concluded that it was these types of      
practices that resembled the closest affinity for abuse at which the Confrontation 
Clause sought to prevent.12  However, this decision came down shortly after the 
Crawford opinion was published, and the Massachusetts court was forced to     
formulate this opinion without the guidance of what exactly constituted testimonial 
evidence.  Although the verdict in Crawford stated that testimonial evidence gives 
rise to the defendant’s right of confrontation, the Court “[left] for another day any 
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”13  The Nation’s
 ________________________  
 7. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 703 (Mass. 2005). 
 8. Id. at 703. 
 9. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 705 (citing Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1969)) (This legal 
theory is established by almost 100 years of jurisprudence, and Massachusetts has held since the early 1920’s that 
it was not unconstitutional to admit a lab report without an authenticating witness, see, e.g. Commonwealth v. 
Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (Mass. 1923)). 
 10. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 704-05. 
 11. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 12. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 704.  
 13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  
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courts had to wait until 2006, two years after Crawford, once Davis v. Washington
and its companion case Hammon v. Indiana were decided.14  There, the Supreme 
Court formulated a guideline of what constitutes testimonial evidence.15 Davis,
coupled with the foundation laid out in Crawford, created the legal doctrines used 
to decide the issue of the Confrontation Clause and drug analysis certificates in 
Melendez-Diaz.
III. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS: WHERE DID THE COURT GO
WRONG?
     A brief recitation of the facts of Melendez-Diaz is necessary to understand the 
potential consequences this decision could have on the approximately 180,000 drug 
cases that face the American criminal justice system annually.16  In 2001, the    
Boston police, acting on a tip, stopped a Kmart employee, Thomas Wright, for 
suspicious activity after exiting a car in the Kmart parking lot.17  After a search of 
Wright turned up four bags containing a substance resembling cocaine, the police 
officers arrested Wright, along with two other men in the car, one being Luis    
Melendez-Diaz.18  While being transported to the police station, the officers      
noticed the men fidgeting in the backseat and a subsequent search of the rear seat 
turned up nineteen additional bags.19  All of the bags were turned over to the state 
laboratory to conduct a chemical analysis on the substances, and indeed the bags 
did contain cocaine.20  The police officials and the state laboratory technicians were 
strictly adhering to Massachusetts’ law requiring them to conduct an analysis on 
any potential illegal substance.21  Upon completion of the laboratory work, the 
technician submitted three “certificates of analysis showing the results of the    
forensic analysis performed on the seized substances.”22  Faced with this evidence 
against him, counsel for Luis Melendez-Diaz made the objection that the          
Confrontation Clause decision in Crawford v. Washington required the technician 
to testify in person.23  The motion was overruled and Luis Melendez-Diaz was 
found guilty, and this simple drug possession/distribution case made its way to the 
highest court in America.  
 ________________________  
 14. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), aff’g State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 834 (Wash. 2005), rev’g
Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005) (hearing in tandem both Davis and Hammon.  Both cases involve 
an issue that flows directly from Crawford, where the Court held that testimonial statements in a criminal trial are 
prohibited by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment if the defendant was not able to cross examine the 
person who made the statement). 
 15. See Id. 
 16. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm (last visited Dec. 5, 
2010) (showing the latest statistical data for the year 2007, where there were over 1.8 million arrests for drug 
offenses; statistically 90% will enter a plea deal, leaving a potential 180,000 cases to be tried in criminal court). 
 17. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.
 20. Id. at 2530-31. 
 21. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 12, 13 (West 2006). 
 22. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. 
 23. Id. 
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When this case reached the Supreme Court it was just four years after the     
decision handed down in Crawford.  Justice Scalia, who also wrote the opinion in 
Crawford, penned the opinion in Melendez-Diaz.  Scalia began by quoting himself, 
stating that “[i]n Crawford, after reviewing the Clause’s historical underpinnings, 
we held that it guarantees a defendant’s right to confront those ‘who bear          
testimony’ against him.”24  However, rather than use a smooth form of synthesis to 
reconcile the two cases, or at least demonstrate the application of Crawford to the 
facts in the current case, Justice Scalia was more concerned with attempting to  
discredit the dissenting opinions.  He mentioned that the Crawford opinion used 
the word affidavits twice, as a form of testimonial evidence.25  Justice Scalia then 
concludes with, “[T]he analysts’ affidavits were testimonial statement, and the  
analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”26  Justice Scalia 
did a fine job of noticing the similar words contained in his two opinions, but he 
failed to connect the dots that would offer any support for his position.  First, one 
must approach the theory that the majority holding in Melendez-Diaz was incorrect, 
and principally so because the decision did not adhere to precedent generated by its 
own author only several years earlier.  
A. Tracking the Changes Made by Crawford and What the Decision Really 
Means for the Confrontation Clause 
     To understand the position taken by the majority, and in particular Justice   Sca-
lia, one must evaluate the central holding and logic in the Crawford decision to 
determine where the analysis departed from precedent.  Prior to the dramatic 
change Crawford required of the Confrontation Clause, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a defendant’s right, under the Sixth Amendment, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against the defendant did not bar admission of an unavailable  
witness’ statement.27  The Court looked to see if the statement bore “adequate   
indicia of reliability”; and to meet this test, evidence had to fall within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception, or bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.28
Justice Scalia took the opportunity in Crawford to examine the Confrontation 
Clause from a historical approach, because as Justice Scalia himself stated, “[the 
Confrontation Clause’s] text does not alone resolve this case . . . [w]e must     
therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its       
meaning.”29
One common theme emerges from the Crawford narrative, a defendant should 
have his “‘accusers,’ i.e. the witnesses against him, brought before him face to 
face.”30  The primary example is the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason.31
 ________________________  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 2532. 
 26. Id.
 27. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).  
 28. Id.
 29. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43 (2004). 
 30. Id. at 43. 
 31. Id. 
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The motif that emerges from this portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion can best be 
summarized by Sir Raleigh himself: “[T]he Proof of the Common Law is by     
witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my 
face.”32  A general theme that Justice Scalia himself harps upon in the historical 
narrative is that an accuser, or a witness who bears testimony against a              
defendant, demands confrontation and cross-examination.  Cobham, Raleigh’s
alleged accomplice, declared the accusation against Raleigh during an examination 
before the Privy Council and again in a letter; then at Raleigh’s trial, the            
accusations of Cobham were read to the jury.33  Justice Scalia arrives at the       
determination that the Confrontation Clause applies to “witnesses” against the  
accused, those who “bear testimony.”34  With the historical foundation in mind, 
Justice Scalia devised a two part test: “First, that we apply the Confrontation 
Clause only to testimonial statements, leaving the remainder to regulation by   
hearsay law . . . [;] Second, that we impose an absolute bar to statements that are 
testimonial, absent a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”35
The facts in Crawford were rather straightforward: Sylvia Crawford, the wife 
of the defendant, made certain statements to the police during an interrogation after 
she witnessed an assault involving her husband.36  She did not testify at trial,     
invoking the right of marital privilege, and the State introduced into evidence the 
statements she made to the police during the interrogation.37  Justice Scalia, and the 
majority, had no reluctance in assertively concluding that: “In this case, the State 
admitted Sylvia’s testimonial statement against petitioner, despite the fact that he 
had no opportunity to cross-examine her.  That alone is sufficient to make out a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.”38  One can picture an immediate impression of 
what constitutes a “testimonial witness” as devised by the Court, perhaps a witness 
who bears direct testimony against the defendant and which the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees the right of confrontation for cross-examination, to test the knowledge 
and reliability of such a witness.  However, the Court states “[w]e leave for another 
day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’39   
A brief look at the consolidated cases contained in Davis v. Washington and 
Hammon v. Indiana illustrates two situations where police officials gathered     
information that, in turn, was used as evidence and testimony in court.40  In Davis,
the evidence was gathered during an assault; and in Hammon, similar evidence was 
gathered immediately after an alleged assault.41  The opinion establishes a         
“testimonial witness/statement” standard focusing on the situation and/or          
 ________________________  
 32. Id. at 44. (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 51. 
 35. Id. at 61. 
 36. Id. at 36.  
 37. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36. 
 38. Id. at 68.  
 39. Id. 
40. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006). 
 41. Id. at 817-20.
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circumstances in which the information is gathered.42  The facts in Davis reveal a 
911 call was placed during an assault in which the operator gathered information 
from the victim to assist the police in resolving the situation.43  In Hammon, the 
police arrived at the scene after an alleged assault, and at that point, when no on- 
going emergency was occurring, began to gather information from the victim 
against the defendant.44  The Court determined that, “[a] 911 call . . . at least the 
initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not    
designed primarily to ‘establish or prove’ some past fact, but to describe current 
circumstances requiring police assistance.”45  The Court held the statements made 
to the 911 operator were distinguishable from Crawford, because the witness stated 
the events as they were actually happening, rather than describing past events.46  In 
Hammon, with facts almost completely analogous to those in Crawford, the      
witness did not appear at the trial, and the statements she made to the police were 
used as evidence against the defendant.47  By viewing the combination of these 
three cases; Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, a logical formulation can be observed 
of what exactly a “testimonial witness or statement” would entail.  This article’s
plain interpretation of a testimonial witness is: a witness, (1) who directly observes 
or is intimately involved in an event or matter, (2) whose testimony has criminal 
implication against the defendant, and (3) the testimony or statements are based 
upon their knowledge and recollection of the event or matter.  Only then does the 
Sixth Amendment ensure the right of confrontation.  From the facts of Davis and 
Hammon, the Court formulated a rule stating:  
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance 
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the   
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.48
It appears this article’s understanding of what creates a “testimonial witness” is 
on par with the workable outline the court provides with its guidelines on police 
interrogations.  The focus is constantly centered on the witnesses’ personal    
knowledge of the event, when and in what manner the witnesses’ statements were 
obtained, and then finally the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
 ________________________  
 42. Id. at 822. 
 43. Id. at 817-18.
 44. Id. at 820.
 45. Id. at 827. 
 46. Id.
 47. Id. at 820. 
 48. Id. at 822.  
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to challenge the knowledge and reliability of the witness if the statements are    
testimonial.  
B. Melendez-Diaz Five-Four Decision:  Why the Minority Was Right and 
How Crawford Was Misapplied 
With the foundation of Crawford, and what appears to be a comprehensible 
framework of a “testimonial witness/statement”, the stage is now set for the      
Supreme Court to confront the issue in Melendez-Diaz.  The question undoubtedly 
becomes how did the Supreme Court reach the holding in Melendez-Diaz, that a 
laboratory technician who submits an affidavit identifying the nature of a substance 
can be considered a “testimonial witness” against the defendant?  The problem lies 
with Justice Scalia’s application of broad conceptual doctrines of what potentially 
constitutes a “testimonial witness” rather than focusing on the facts in the particular 
case.  As the dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz notes, the main facts in      
Crawford and Davis/Hammon are completely distinguishable from the facts in  
Melendez-Diaz.49  The Court decided that the witnesses in Crawford and Hammon
were testimonial witnesses against the defendant.  A common relationship between 
the two witnesses is that they can both be described as two ordinary, or             
conventional witnesses, meaning they were personally involved in the events, both 
happened to be victims, and both offered personal firsthand accounts as they     
perceived the facts to be.50  In the case against Luis Melendez-Diaz, a laboratory 
technician was given an unknown substance, and then used technology such as: 
infrared spectrophotometry, magnetic resonances, gas chromatography, or mass 
spectrometry to determine the characteristic of the substances, which enabled 
another technician to identify the substances.51  Then one of the technicians swore 
by a certificate of identification, which was notarized, and used the certificate in 
court to show the nature and identity of the substances.52  If one thing can be     
understood from Crawford and Hammon, it is that both arguments were based on 
the common premise that the witnesses had personal knowledge of some aspect of 
the defendant’s guilt or actions, and that evidence or testimony may not be        
admitted without the accused having the right to confront these types of            
witnesses.53  That was the central concern of the Sixth Amendment, the fear the 
Founders had of the common practice in the colonies of examining witnesses 
against particular men ex parte.54  This concern is what Crawford establishes in its 
holding, that Sylvia Crawford’s ex parte police interrogation and tape-recorded 
statements that the stabbing was not in self-defense, cannot be used as evidence 
against the defendant simply because it fell into an unavailable witness hearsay 
 ________________________  
 49. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the legal doctrine of a “testimonial witness” was crafted based upon the particular facts of these cases). 
 50. Id.  
 51. See 2 PAUL GIANNELLI & EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 23.03 (4th ed. 2007).  
 52. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.  
 53. See Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 54. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47. 
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exception.55  Sylvia Crawford was interrogated twice; and under the circumstances 
of first being read her Miranda rights, and second, making statements during a  
police interrogation, one would assume Sylvia Crawford, or any objective witness, 
would reasonably believe that her statements would be used at a later trial.56  Using 
this same mode of analysis, a different result should have been apparent in        
Melendez-Diaz; yet, somehow the majority is able to reach the conclusion that a 
laboratory technician performing a chemical analysis is analogous to a witness like 
Sylvia Crawford. 
The flaw, once again, comes from focusing on the doctrinal theories in     
Crawford and incorrectly applying the applicable law.  Justice Scalia focuses on 
the fact in the Crawford opinion he mentions the use of affidavits twice when   
describing possible classification of testimonial evidence.57  However, placed into 
context, the term ‘affidavit’ refers to “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent . . . pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially.”58  Justice Scalia is right in one regard, the “certificates of 
analysis” were indeed “affidavits”, but they were not what Crawford or the Sixth 
Amendment envisioned within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.59  In   
Melendez-Diaz, the laboratory technician submitted an affidavit based on the    
systematic readout and identification of the substance, in this case cocaine,       
generated by a machine.  The actual analysis process, which entails the work of 
more than one technician, further complicates the issue of whom to call                 
as a witness against the defendant.60  The analysis process itself is rather                   
uncomplicated.  Taking infrared spectrophotometry as an example, a technician 
introduces the unknown substance into the machine, the machine prints out a 
graph, which another technician compares to known graphs, either by using   
knowledge of peak properties or using a computer database, probably both; then 
the identity of the drug is confirmed.61  The process does not result in a guess or an 
assumption of what a technician perceives the substance to be.  If that were the 
case, the technician would be a testimonial witness and cross-examination would 
be necessary to ensure the defendant was receiving a fair trial.  Before Melendez-
Diaz, the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all held that these types of lab 
reports were nontestimonial statements produced by machines or computers.62
Until Melendez-Diaz, there had always been a morally conscious objective to the 
requirement of confrontation and the use of cross-examination of a witness.  A 
 ________________________  
 55. Id. at 41. 
 56. Id. at 38-39.   
 57. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531-32. 
 58. Id. at 2531.
 59. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004). (“[D]eclaration of facts written down and sworn to by 
the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.”). 
 60. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546-50. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 61. Marcela A. Oliveira-Antunovich, Interdisciplinary Applications of Chemistry through Engineering in 
Modern Medicine: CSI New Haven (2006), http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/2006/5/06.05.07.x.html. 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2010). 
 62. Joe Bourne, Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When Is a Lab Report Testimonial?, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1079 (2009).
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defendant may wish to challenge the reliability or credibility of the witness, or 
demonstrate the potential bias or prejudice of a witness; but whatever the reason, 
there has been an understandable right for an accused to cross-examine the witness.  
This is where logic comes to a screeching halt in the Melendez-Diaz decision.  Any 
Sixth Amendment rational behind confrontation and cross-examination becomes 
useless.  Technicians have no knowledge of the defendant or of any facts in the 
case, and the line of questioning would be limited to: “Did you receive X          
substance?  Yes.  Did you place it in Y machine?  Yes.  Did the results indicate it 
was an illegal drug?  Yes.  Did you tamper with the substance or the results?  No.”
There is a clear distinction between “mechanical” testing, like the test performed in 
Melendez-Diaz, and more complex testing.  “A defendant cannot effectively cross-
examine statements in the former ‘mechanical’ category even when the technician 
is present, whereas the complex, conclusion-heavy tests . . . often require          
explanation from the person responsible for the procedure.”63
There must be some minimal level of a relationship between the witness and 
the defendant to reach the valid concerns of Sixth Amendment protection.  As 
demonstrated by the historical analysis illustrated in Crawford, and in the case’s
holding, confrontation was meant for a witness in the sense that the witness        
had personal knowledge of the matter.  In the context of an expert witness,               
confrontation, again, falls within the right of the defendant if the expert is         
formulating an opinion based upon an understanding of the relevant facts of the 
case and the defendant.  An additional fallacy, exuberantly expressed by Justice 
Scalia, was that technicians could reasonably believe that their statements would be 
available for use at a later trial.64  Again, Justice Scalia is taking this idea out of 
context from his opinion in Crawford.  The technician is not making a statement 
based from memory, nor is the purpose to make a statement that will be used later 
in court, that is the objective or expectation of the prosecutor.  The sole purpose of 
the technician is to identify the substance.  Technicians, as demonstrated in        
Melendez-Diaz, have no knowledge of the defendant or of the facts in the case; 
they are focused on matching up faceless samples.65  What Justice Scalia neglected 
to recall when selecting quotes from his former decision in Crawford was one of 
the few examples deciphering the meaning of testimonial: “Whatever else the term 
covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before 
a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern 
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed.”66  How this central statement can extend itself to a technician’s affidavit, 
based on a mechanical analysis of a substance, is a question the majority opinion in 
Melendez-Diaz failed to answer.  
 ________________________  
 63. Thomas F. Burke III, The Test Results Said What? The Post-Crawford Admissibility of Hearsay    
Forensic Evidence, 53 S.D. L. REV. 1, 16 (2008).
64. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532-34. 
 65. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 398.1 (2d ed. 1999 & 
Supp. 2004). 
 66. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  
9
: Melendez-Diaz and the Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2010
130 Barry Law Review Vol. 15  
The holding in Melendez-Diaz not only deviates from Crawford, but it does not 
find support in the Sixth Amendment itself.  The Sixth Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and      
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which      
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be  
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be           
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the       
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.67
As Justice Scalia notes in Crawford, the Framers of the Constitution included 
the Confrontation Clause to ensure that criminal defendants would face their     
accusers.68  The plain meaning of the Sixth Amendment, even coupled with   
Crawford’s historical analysis is of little help, nor is it persuasive for the holding in 
Melendez-Diaz, because the Framers could not have imagined the role scientific 
evidence would play in the modern legal system.69  So how did Justice Scalia arrive 
at the decision in Melendez-Diaz when the text of the Confrontation Clause states 
only that the accused shall have the right “to be confronted with witnesses against 
him,” and even the Crawford opinion acknowledges that “[o]ne could plausibly 
read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean those who actually testify at trial, 
those whose statements are offered at trial, or something in-between.”70  The     
majority decision in Melendez-Diaz failed to realize that the affidavits submitted by 
the technicians were not within any conceptual range of the previously mentioned 
field.  As was held in virtually every state across the country, laboratory reports 
were considered to be routine documentary evidence, and thus non-testimonial by 
their very nature.71  It is not the statement of the technician that is essentially used 
to identify the substance in the affidavit, but rather the statement of the machine 
being used to conduct the test.   
In Massachusetts, the origin of Melendez-Diaz, the state court evaluated the use 
of the analysis reports, and observed that the test results were non-discretionary 
and presented a “primary fact” rather than opinion.72  The laboratory technician 
was not submitting an affidavit based on an opinion of the identity of the           
substance.  The Massachusetts court noted the affidavit was essentially fact, the 
genuine evidence against the defendant was the illegal substance itself, the        
affidavits were no different than any other non-testimonial statement and they  
 ________________________  
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 68. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48-49. 
 69. See Bradley Morin, Science, Crawford, and Testimonial Hearsay: Applying the Confrontation Clause 
to the Laboratory, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1243, 1255 (2005). 
 70. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43 (citations omitted). 
 71. See People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see also Commonwealth v. 
Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 n.4 (Mass. 2005) (showing that from California to Massachusetts the common judicial 
decree that laboratory reports were akin to business documents and did not fall with the Confrontation Clause).  
 72. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 704. 
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easily fell within the business or official record hearsay exception.73  The accused 
had the same access to the incriminating substance used against them, and could 
conduct their own laboratory analysis.74  Justice Scalia stated that the affidavits in 
Melendez-Diaz fell within the “core class of testimonial statements” described in 
Crawford.75  However, as stated in Crawford and reiterated in Melendez-Diaz, the 
core class of testimonial statements is “ex parte in court testimony or its functional 
equivalent,”76 and even though Justice Scalia listed one of the examples as being an 
affidavit, it is not the same type of testimonial statement as the diction suggests.  
This was not a situation where one of the two other men arrested with Luis       
Melendez-Diaz made a confession or statement to the police affirming Luis      
Melendez-Diaz’s possession of the cocaine and then used the statement as evidence 
without confrontation; but was rather a scientific analysis report merely stating the 
identity of the substance.  The Sixth Amendment and the holding in Crawford were 
designed to protect the accused from the former scenario not the latter.  
IV. IF THE MELENDEZ-DIAZ DECISION WAS CORRECT WHAT DOES THAT
MAKE OF CRAWFORD?
This article thus far has demonstrated why the decision in Melendez-Diaz was 
incorrect. However, if the Court focuses just on the strict diction in Crawford, as 
was done here, this can be viewed as an appropriate decision that follows          
established precedent.  Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz sees 
the Court’s holding as: “[A] body of formalist and wooden rules, divorced from 
precedent, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the Clause.”77  The     
dissent was correct in all respects except one; the holding is not “divorced from 
precedent,” and this is where a serious problem arises.  If a strict interpretation of 
Crawford can yield this result, then it was Crawford that contained an inherent 
flaw in its reasoning.  Viewed in its most inclusive application, Crawford can   
encompass scientific affidavits as “testimonial statements.”  As Professor Farb 
illustrates, taken verbatim from the Crawford opinion, the holding can include the 
affidavits from a chemical analysis: 
The Court did not set out a complete definition of testimonial 
statement.  However, it ruled that such a statement includes, at a 
minimum, prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, testimony    
before a grand jury or at a former trial, police interrogation, and a 
plea allocution showing the existence of a conspiracy.  The       
opinion also gave other examples without explicitly ruling that 
they are testimonial statements.  The examples relevant to a   
chemical analyst’s affidavit include: (1) affidavits or similar      
 ________________________  
73. See Id. at 706. 
 74. See Id.
 75. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.  
 76. Id. at 2531. 
 77. Id. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially; (2) extrajudicial statements contained in  
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits; and (3)   
statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.78
From this austere application of Crawford, several factors would suggest that a 
technician’s affidavit would be considered testimonial statements.79  Justice Scalia 
provides a range of potential guidelines or definitions of what would constitute a 
testimonial statement in Crawford.  Applying these broad definitions to the facts in 
Melendez-Diaz, it becomes evident that a chemical technician who prepares an 
affidavit identifying an illegal substance that will be used at trial would fall under 
the guidelines of a testimonial statement:   
(1) the analyst preparing the affidavit would reasonably expect it to 
be used prosecutorially; (2) the affidavit contains an extrajudicial 
statement in formalized testimonial material; and (3) the statement 
in the affidavit is made under circumstances that would lead an  
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.80
Justice Scalia noted in his opinion that certificates specified on their face their 
evidentiary purpose, so the analysts must have been aware that their certificates 
would be used in criminal trials.81  For these reasons, the opinion in Melendez-Diaz
is correct, and contrary to what the dissent believed, there was no divorce from 
precedent.  The problem now becomes what Crawford, and its subsequent         
application in Melendez-Diaz, will confer to the nation’s criminal justice system. 
The country’s effort to immediately confront the many questions that now face 
the judicial system is evident in the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz.82  The  
decision “has thrown state and federal prosecutions into disarray as familiar modes 
of proof are called into question.”83  By no means should the Sixth Amendment and 
the Confrontation Clause be infringed upon because of possible inconveniences to 
the courts or the prosecution.  However, the holding in Melendez-Diaz had no   
 ________________________  
 78. Richard L. Farb, Constitutionality of G.S. 20-139.1(e1) (Use of Chemical Analyst’s Affidavit in   
District Court) After Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 63, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (June 4, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
 79. See Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.  
 82. See Christina Miller & Michael D. Ricciuti, Legal Analysis: Crawford Comes to the Lab: Melendez-
Diaz and the Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 53 B.B.J. 13, 13 (2009).   
 83. Id. (citing Tabaka v. District of Colombia, 976 A.2d 173, 175-76 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reversing an    
operating a motor vehicle without a permit conviction on Melendez-Diaz grounds because certificate of no-record 
inadmissible); Grant v. Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing driving while        
intoxicated conviction because certificate of the results of a breathalyzer-type device admitted into evidence  
without the testimony of the breathalyzer operator in violation of Melendez-Diaz)). 
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rational relationship to the historical underpinnings of the Sixth Amendment.   
Fundamentally, what is of concern here is that Melendez-Diaz raises new questions 
about “just how far Crawford reaches.”84  A practical examination of potential  
consequences from the decision in Melendez-Diaz gives rise to significant        
concerns.  Focusing again on the State of Massachusetts, where the case originated, 
in the year 2007 alone, the district courts saw 46,685 narcotics cases.85  The two 
laboratories that performed narcotics analysis employed just twenty-three people.86
In 2007, one of these laboratories analyzed 42,583 items, resulting in delays of 
approximately four months for certificates.87  This delay was only for the needed 
certificate or affidavits, and not an actual appearance by a technician.  A reasonable 
concern, and one articulated by Attorney General Martha Coakley, who argued 
Melendez-Diaz in the Supreme Court, is that “the ruling will result in the dismissal 
of drug cases based exclusively on the unavailability of analysts.”88  According to 
the Attorney General, “arranging for the testimony of these analysts at every drug 
prosecution is ‘virtually impossible with current staffing.’”89  This, unfortunately, 
is what Crawford demands.  The “testimonial standard,” when broadly applied, 
reveals the intrinsic flaws in the standard, as is seen in the result of the Melendez-
Diaz decision.  Furthermore, although the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz
focuses on a technician’s drug analysis certificate:  
[the] holding applies to all forensic evidence if that evidence takes 
the form of a declaration of facts sworn to and provided to the 
prosecution for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact 
for the purposes of criminal prosecution.  Evidence such as DNA 
analysis, blood-alcohol or other bodily fluid analysis, breathalyzer 
tests, ballistic or other firearm-related tests and hair or fingerprint 
analysis would certainly require a witness to testify about the  
analysis.  The question remains as to whether an analyst would be 
able to testify based on facts as developed by another analyst.90
The substance analysis process requires more than one technician; the problem will 
become at what stage or which technician will be making an accusation against the 
defendant, and thus have to testify.91  Lastly, the problem of whether one         
 ________________________  
 84. Id.
 85. Brief for The National District Attorneys Association et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Respondent at 
12 n.5, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591, 2008 WL 4185393, 12 n.5.) 
 86. Id. at 14.
 87. Id. at 15.
 88. Miller & Ricciuti, supra note 82, at 14 (citing David E. Frank and Kimberly Atkins, Dismissals Feared 
in Wake of Landmark Lab-Report Decision, 37 MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY 1873, 1897 (July 6, 2009)). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 15 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2559-61 (2009)) (listing, in      
Appendices A and B, state cases from around the country that allow admission of forensic reports without     
confrontation of the reports’ author, and those that require confrontation before admission). 
 91. See Id.
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technician would be able to testify based on facts developed by another            
technician’s analysis will have to be resolved.92
Unfortunately, what Justice Scalia quickly brushed aside, and afforded no time 
for any analysis, is the respondents’ claim that the confrontation is not required 
because the analysts are not “accusatory” witnesses.93  By comparing the two  
standards – Crawford’s testimonial standard and the Respondent’s “accusatory”
standard – it appears that the Respondent’s “accusatory” witness standard is more 
aligned with both the concerns of the Sixth Amendment, and the public policy  
concerns of an effective and fair criminal justice system.  By examining these two 
Confrontation Clause doctrines and applying them to the same facts presented in 
Melendez-Diaz, it is evident that the “accusatory witnesses” standard propounded 
by the respondent is superior and more readily conforms to the Sixth Amendment 
than does Justice Scalia’s “testimonial witness” standard adopted in Crawford.  A 
laboratory report differs in important aspects from the sort of statement that the 
Confrontation Clause was designed to address.94  Lab reports do not accuse the 
defendant of any criminal activity, but are merely the result of objective, scientific 
analysis.95
Under the umbrella of a “testimonial witness” standard, this far removed drug 
analysis report is now considered a principle evil that the Confrontation Clause 
sought to avoid.96  Was this the reasonable intention of the Framers when they  
constructed the Sixth Amendment: To protect an accused from an affidavit stating 
the chemical composition of a substance?  No.  “These facts are entirely neutral 
and do not . . . accuse anyone of any criminal conduct.”97  The source of the      
accusation against the defendant is not the technician submitting an affidavit on the 
identity of a substance, but other witnesses that link the substance to the person on 
trial.98  Simply put, the Confrontation Clause’s, “origins [are] unmistakably      
accusation-based terms: ‘The proof was usually given by reading depositions,   
confessions of accomplices, letters, and the like; and this occasioned frequent   
demands by the prisoner to have his ‘accusers,’ i.e., the witnesses against him,
brought   before him face to face.”99  The text of the Sixth Amendment also      
supports an   accusation-based focus, “[the] modified repetition of the word      
accused strongly confirms that the Sixth Amendment as a whole is accusation 
based.”100  As counsel for Melendez-Diaz noted, “[t]his same focus is reflected in 
the Confrontation Clause’s text, which refers specifically to ‘witnesses against’ the 
accused, not any ‘witness with relevant testimony.’”101  This is where the “testi-
 ________________________  
 92. See Id.
 93. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct.  2527, 2533 (1008); See also Brief for Respondent at 
10, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2533 (No. 07-591, 2008 WL 4103864, 10).   
 94. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 93, at 14. 
 95. See Id.
 96. See Id.
 97. Id. at 16-17. 
 98. See Id. at 17. 
 99. Id. at 17-18 (citing 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883) 
(quoted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)).  
 100. A. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FIRST PRINCIPLES 102-03 (1997). 
 101. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 93, at 18; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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monial witness” standard is inherently flawed; it loses focus on what the Sixth 
Amendment sought to avoid and what protection it sought to enable.   
“A drug analysis certificate bears no resemblance to the types of accusations 
that historically have been the ‘core concern of the Confrontation Clause.’”102
What Crawford attempts to do is meaningful, but when Justice Scalia strayed too 
far from the actual text of the Confrontation Clause itself, the results became    
unstable.  The holding in both Davis and Hammon were a logical application of 
Crawford and fit neatly into the understanding of the Sixth Amendment            
Confrontation Clause.  It only took another two years, when the Court heard     
Melendez-Diaz, to realize that the application of Crawford departed significantly 
from what the Framers could have ever intended or envisioned.  When a witness 
makes an accusation, the typical focus is on historical facts explaining “what [the 
accused] did, when, where, why, how, with whom, to whom, and so on.”103  A 
technician who prepares drug analysis certificates has no knowledge of            
these historical facts.104  Their job, instead, is to study the current physical state              
of a substance, confirming both its chemical composition and weight.105  When        
adhering to the text and historical meaning of the Confrontation Clause, an       
“accusatory witness” standard has the ability to produce more favorable results, 
compared to the “testimonial witness” standard, when dealing with policy concerns 
of an overburdened criminal justice system. It affords the full rights and protections 
that the Sixth Amendment was designed to ensure.  
V. CONCLUSION
The Melendez-Diaz decision has implications that reach far beyond the its 
holding in the present case.  The already overburdened criminal justice system now 
faces the difficulty of losing precious time while technicians are busy testifying in 
court rather than working in the laboratory performing their jobs.  In the last few 
years alone, there have been monumental changes to the Court’s interpretation of 
the Sixth Amendment, from the Rehnquist’s Court standard of “indicia of         
reliability” to the Robert’s Court distinction between “testimonial” and “non-
testimonial” statements with the former requiring confrontation.   Unfortunately, it 
seems that neither of these two systems is able to perform the delicate balance of 
upholding Sixth Amendment rights while applying practical policy concerns.  If 
one thing is evident, the “testimonial witness” standard devised by Justice Scalia –
which sought to simplify and return the Sixth Amendment to its originally        
constructed meaning – was simply too smart by half.  If held narrowly, by strict 
application to the facts in the cases, it can provide a workable standard that honors 
what the Framers sought to accomplish, that is, guaranteeing the accused the right 
to confront their accusers.  The problem is the application of “testimonial state-
 ________________________  
 102. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 93, at 23. 
 103. A. Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 688 (1996); see also Davis v.        
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827-28 (2006) (statements “describing past events” are testimonial).  
 104. See Morin, supra note 69, at 1258. 
 105. See Id.
15
: Melendez-Diaz and the Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2010
136 Barry Law Review Vol. 15  
ments” as a legal doctrine, and the flaw that is apparent in Melendez-Diaz.  But, as 
the often quoted phrase goes, hindsight is twenty-twenty; this article has the luxury 
to re-examine Crawford through the lens of Melendez-Diaz and advocate for an 
“accusatory” standard based on this hindsight. With the narrow five-four decision 
Melendez-Diaz assembled, this issue will likely find its way to the halls of the   
Supreme Court in the near future, with the distinct possibility of a different       
outcome.  
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